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1. Introduction
The McKell Institute is an independent, not-for-profit, public 
policy institute dedicated to developing practical policy ideas and 
contributing to public debate. The McKell Institute takes its name 
from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and Governor–General  
of Australia, William McKell.
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through significant social, economic and environmental reforms
For more information phone (02) 9113 0944 or visit www.mckellinstitute.org.au
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The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
represent the views of the McKell Institute’s members, affiliates,  
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THE
McKell
Institute
THE
McKell
Institute
The authors of this paper have utilised a range of publicly available 
information and our own analysis in compiling this paper, along with 
information provided from various industry participants.
THE
McKell
Institute
T H E  M C K E L L  I N S T I T U T E
DECEMBER 2014
Nothing to gain, 
plenty to lose:
Why the government, households  
and businesses could end up paying  
a high price for electricity privatisation
STEPHEN KOUKOULAS 
THOMAS DEVLIN
4STEPHEN KOUKOULAS
Stephen Koukoulas 
is Managing Director 
of Market Economics, 
a firm he established 
in January 2012 
in response to the 
need for independent 
and tailored 
macroeconomic 
analysis. 
Stephen has a rare 
professional experience over more than 25 years 
as an economist in government, banking, financial 
markets and policy formulation. Stephen was 
Senior Economic Advisor to the former Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard, worked in the Commonwealth 
Treasury and before that he was the global head of 
economic research and strategy for TD Securities 
in London.
Stephen also spent 5 years at Citibank Australia, 
including as Chief Economist.
Stephen started his career as an economist in the 
Commonwealth Treasury in the mid-1980s and 
hold a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics (Honours) 
from the Australian National University. 
THOMAS DEVLIN
Thomas is a 
management 
consultant, working 
for one of the 
world’s largest and 
most successful 
strategy consulting 
firms, which advises 
numerous Fortune 
500 companies 
as well as many of 
Australia’s largest 
corporations.
By background, Thomas is an economist, and 
holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics (Honours) 
from the University of Sydney.  He has contributed 
to a variety of past research at the McKell Institute, 
and his policy interests span multiple topics 
including economic and quantitative analysis as 
well as infrastructure funding and financing. 
About the authors
THE
McKell
Institute
MCKELL INSTITUTE   |   Nothing to gain, plenty to lose: 
Why the government, households and businesses could end up paying a high price for electricity privatisation 5
Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3
Recommendations and Key Findings ......................................................................................................................................................................5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................9
Methodology and Summary Findings for section 1 .....................................................................................................................11
Methodology and Summary Findings for section 2 .................................................................................................................12
The Structure and Operaton of the NSW Electricity Sector ..................................................................................14
Natural Monopoly, Regulation and Revenue Determination ...................................................................................17
Normal Privatisation Arguments do not apply to a Monopoly T&D Network ........................18
Detailed Findings: Section 1 – Efficiency of the T&D Network Businesses ...............................21
Network Costs are Murky .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................21
Simplistic ‘first glance’ analysis might suggests private networks have lower opex ........................................23
Even if non-comparable costs are removed, the results appear to be similar ..........................................................24
However, size absolutely matters – physical span accounts for most of the variation  
in upkeep costs between public and private companies ........................................................................................................................25
Labour costs: public entities are competitive and efficient ...............................................................................................................28
Administration costs: private companies underperform against public entities ...................................................29
Publicly-owned firms are not afraid to undertake capex when it is needed ...............................................................30
Publicly-owned firms have more cyclical investment cycles because they  
prioritise investment efficiency over steady dividend streams for private investors ......................................34
No clear evidence of publicly-held transmission companies underperforming .....................................................38
Households are set to pay more under privatisation ..................................................................................................................................39
Detailed Findings: Section 2 – Consequences for the budget ......................................................................44
Short-term budgetary benefits are likely very modest ...........................................................................................................................44
Medium- to long-term impacts likely to be detrimental as payments dry up ...........................................................46
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................50
Appendix: comments on the AER draft determination ........................................................................................................51
References ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................52
THE
McKell
Institute
6
Foreword
Equally, most Australians would agree that the 
private sector has a vital role to play in the delivery 
of infrastructure and services to our community. 
The ideological privatisation wars of the past are 
over. Today, the mainstream discussion about 
privatisation is substantially more civil. The debate 
is free of its ideological shackles, and understands 
that potential privatisations must be carefully 
examined on a case-by-case basis.
The debate about the privatisation of NSWs 
electricity Transmission and Distribution assets 
is hugely important for the NSW Government. 
Privatisation is currently being touted as one 
possible solution for providing new transport 
infrastructure without the state having to take on 
substantial new debt. While the McKell Institute 
agrees that investing in transport infrastructure 
is critical to boosting productivity and economic 
growth we should not allow ourselves to believe 
that the sale of these assets are the only means to 
achieve it. 
The Transmission and Distribution assets 
deliver reliable, steady dividend streams to the 
Government, with each of these companies 
achieving an exceptional return on equity. The 
$1.7B that the NSW Government earned from the 
network last year was equal to over 25% of payroll 
tax, 30% of transfer duties, and nearly 90% of 
taxes on gambling and betting. 
The sale of these dividend streams needs to 
be considered carefully given the substantial 
economic challenges facing the state. Vertical 
Fiscal Imbalance – where the Australian 
Government raises revenues in excess of its 
spending responsibilities while State governments 
have insufficient revenue from their own sources 
to finance spending responsibilities – is already 
short changing state and territory budgets by 
$85 billion per year. This situation is set to worsen 
following the Australian Government’s decision 
to substantially reduce funding payments to the 
states. In the long run, state governments will be 
squeezed by the ageing of our population. By 
2050, the ratio of workers to non-workers will 
decline from 5-to-1 today to 2.4-to-1. 
It is in this context that the privatisation of NSW’s 
electricity Transmission and Distribution assets 
needs to be considered. Fiscally responsible 
governments must look beyond the economic 
challenges of today to consider the substantial 
challenges facing our state in the future. Credit 
rating agencies place a substantially higher 
weighting on whether or not a government is 
able to keep revenue growth above expenses 
growth than they do on a government’s overall 
level of debt. When confronted by the challenging 
dichotomy of rising health and ageing costs 
and proportionally shrinking tax receipts, the 
decision to part with a stable and growing revenue 
stream represents a fundamental misstep in 
fiscal management that is likely to leave future 
governments with substantially more challenging 
budget scenarios. By linking the proceeds of the 
sale to new transport infrastructure, the NSW 
Government’s current asset recycling strategy 
Australia has moved on from the privatisation debates of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Very few Australians would deny the benefits that have come from privatisations at 
Qantas, Telstra, or the Commonwealth bank. 
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could instead increase the cost of debt, making 
it harder to fund transport infrastructure into the 
future. 
This may be justifiable if there were substantial 
other benefits to be achieved through privatisation, 
for example, lower prices for consumers. However, 
unlike most other assets privatisations, NSW’s 
electricity market functions as a natural monopoly. 
The fundamental benefits of greater efficiency and 
lower prices resulting from enhanced competition 
cannot be automatically expected to occur within 
this natural monopoly setting. 
Recent commentary has argued that privatisation 
of NSW’s Transmission and Distribution networks 
will improve efficiency and reduce prices. Our 
analysis has found that this is fundamentally not 
the case. Regrettably, most of these previous 
studies have failed to properly account for factors 
that are largely beyond the control of network 
operators, including the physical span of the 
networks themselves, or other state-specific factors 
including state based taxes and regulations. Once 
these factors are appropriately accounted for, it 
becomes clear that public companies operate just 
as efficiently, and in some cases more efficiently, 
than their private counterparts. Most concerning 
are the higher overhead costs associated with 
privatised network businesses in Victoria, including 
spending on administration, marketing, advertising, 
and executive remuneration. Our report found 
no evidence to suggest that power prices would 
decline under private ownership. Instead, prices 
may be marginally higher as a result. 
Given these factors, it is hard to see how 
privatisation of NSW’s Transmission and 
Distribution assets is in any way beneficial either to 
consumers or to the financial position of the state. 
The NSW Government must find ways to improve 
the fiscal strength of its budget that don’t involve 
increasing the burden on future governments. It 
must also examine other methods for funding the 
productivity enhancing transport infrastructure that 
NSW desperately needs. The McKell Institute has 
also recently released a report on this topic that it 
highly recommends as an alternative approach to 
achieving this end - Getting Us There: Funding 
the Transport Infrastructure of Tomorrow. 
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Executive Summary
To put these figures into perspective, the $1.7B 
the NSW Government earns from the network 
businesses are equal to over 25% of payroll tax, 
30% of transfer duties, and nearly 90% of taxes on 
gambling and betting.2 
In June 2014, the NSW Government announced 
the sale of the state’s Transmission and T&D 
assets. Similar proposals have been mooted 
by past governments and this report considers 
the likely outcomes associated with the sale. In 
particular, it addresses two arguments: 
 The assertion that a privatised T&D network 
will operate more efficiently than the current 
regime, translating into lower electricity costs for 
consumers and businesses; 
 The argument that the sale of the assets 
represents a fiscally responsible move, with 
the NSW Government using the proceeds to 
partially fund its planned major infrastructure 
projects. 
After extensive analysis, the report finds that, based 
on the implications for the budget and the efficiency 
of the entity, there is no logical case for privatisation 
of NSW’s electricity T&D network. The report 
finds that the argument for electricity privatisation 
is based on questionable assumptions and 
generalisations about privatisation more broadly. 
As with other natural monopolies, the fundamental 
privatisation canons of competition and benefits of 
efficiency do not apply in the same way as a normal 
market. 
This report has undertaken an empirical, data-
driven approach to testing these arguments. 
Regrettably, previous studies that have found in 
favour of electricity privatisation haven’t undertaken 
the necessary depth of analysis and have unfairly 
provided comparisons between companies that 
could not be reasonably considered like-for-like.  
These analyses have missed many important 
layers of complexity when considering both the 
efficiency of public networks and the likely costs 
to government finances and credit ratings in the 
medium- to long-term.  
When considering the relative efficiency of public 
and private networks, one key factor that is often 
overlooked is the physical span associated with 
each network – that is, the number of kilometres 
covered to service the customers on a given 
network. One of the critical findings of this report 
was that, after accounting for the varying physical 
spans of each network, privately-owned network 
providers operating in the National Electricity 
In the 2014 Financial Year, NSW’s electricity Transmission & Distributon (T&D) 
businesses paid $1.7B to the NSW Government. This included $872M in dividends 
paid this Financial Year, as well as $829M in income tax equivalent payments. 
Payments in the 2013 Financial Year also totaled $1.7B.1 For the NSW budget, these 
payments represent a relatively stable and low-risk cash flow. 
...the $1.7B the NSW Government earns from 
the network businesses are equal to over 25% of 
payroll tax, 30% of transfer duties, and nearly 90% 
of taxes on gambling and betting.
...When considering the relative efficiency of 
public and private networks, one key factor 
that is often overlooked is the physical span 
associated with each network–...
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Market were in fact underperforming relative to their 
publicly-owned counterparts – including in NSW.
Once this was adjusted for, NSW public providers 
were found to be operating more efficiently than 
comparable private networks interstate in terms of 
operating expenditures (opex). 
Specifically, this report finds that privately-owned 
providers frequently have higher overheads than 
comparable public providers, and that their 
overheads have been growing at a materially faster 
rate than public providers over the past eight years. 
Capital Expenditure (capex) for NSW networks 
was highly inflated in the last regulatory period 
primarily because of the costs associated with 
asset replacement and renewal, though also in part 
because of the requirement to meet more stringent 
reliability and safety regulations. 
A major finding of this report is that as NSW exits 
the peak of its investment cycle, forecasts now 
suggest that capex will be materially lower for the 
NSW network from next year onwards. 
Importantly, recent investments have positioned the 
state well, over the long-run, to respond to future 
requirements of the network – including growing 
demand on various parts of the network. Privately-
owned companies operate under different incentives 
and are frequently more concerned with providing 
consistent, less-volatile returns to shareholders than 
they are with addressing long-term supply issues. 
This requirement to ensure consistent returns 
restricts the capex investment program of private 
operators, providing them with less flexibility to 
achieve efficient capex over the long-run.
On the question of budget management and 
government finances, the report found that the 
NSW Government’s current asset recycling strategy 
– a strategy designed to spend the proceeds 
from asset sales on new transport infrastructure 
investments – is more likely to have a negative 
impact on the state’s credit rating over the medium- 
to long-term. 
Credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s places 
a significantly higher weighting on the ability of 
governments to keep their recurrent revenue above 
their expenditures than it does on the overall level 
of debt held by each government. The sale of a 
valuable dividend stream should only be expected 
to have a positive impact on the long-term budget 
balance if that money is used to generate a revenue 
stream that is larger than that which is being 
foregone (or to reduce costs by an amount greater 
than the revenue which is being foregone).
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The NSW Government has announced that a 
significant proportion of privatisation proceeds 
will be invested back into transport infrastructure, 
including on new rail and road projects. Rail 
projects in particular incur substantial recurrent 
liabilities with their operations, as do many major 
road projects. The implication of this is that the 
NSW Government will effectively be selling a stable, 
recurrent revenue stream in order to produce 
new assets with recurrent liabilities attached to 
them. While this report does not oppose publicly-
subsidised transport, it does note that the NSW 
Government has given little consideration to 
alternate methods of funding the investment 
beyond its plan to sell off the network businesses
Whilst privatisation may provide a marginal, short-
term boost to credit ratings through the freeing up 
of new capital and lowering of debt, the impact of 
privatisation on credit ratings is at best neutral and 
could very well prove to be negative in the medium- 
to long-term. This is likely to increase the borrowing 
costs for government in the future by increasing 
the cost of debt, further reducing the capacity of 
government to invest in infrastructure and essential 
services. 
The report considers that a medium-term 
deterioration in state finances and credit ratings 
could represent a significant challenge for the NSW 
Government given the Australian Government’s 
decision to significantly reduce federal funding for 
essential services. At the same time, the NSW 
Government faces other budgetary challenges 
including the rising costs associated with an 
ageing population, and the risk of stagnation, or 
even decline, in stamp duty receipts if house price 
growth and turnover begins to moderate. 
Given that the proposal to privatise the T&D assets 
does not necessarily improve the efficiency of 
the entities involved, does not lower costs for 
business or consumers and could in fact increase 
them, damages the budget position over the 
medium-term and given that public opposition is 
overwhelming, this report recommends that the 
NSW Government abandon its plans to privatise 
the state’s T&D assets.
...the NSW Government will effectively be 
selling a stable, recurrent revenue stream in 
order to produce new assets with recurrent 
liabilities attached to them.
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Recommendations  
and Key Findings
This report recommends that the NSW Government 
instead use the strong, consistent, long-run 
T&D asset dividend flow to support ongoing 
infrastructure spending or to consolidate the 
financial position of the state.
Although this report finds no compelling evidence 
that network businesses would operate more 
efficiently under private ownership than public 
ownership, this report recommends that a thorough 
review be undertaken to assess performance of 
NSW T&D businesses with the aim of realising 
potential efficiency gains while maintaining 
public ownership. Any review should consider 
industry structure, operational matters, and social 
outcomes, with all efficiency gains to be reinvested 
in government services or passed to consumers by 
way of price reductions.
The report recommends that publicly-owned T&D 
firms should continue to take a long-term view 
to their investment plans. This is economically 
prudent, given that electricity supply needs to 
be planned out many years in advance of actual 
network demands.
Decisions by both the current and any future NSW 
Government to invest in transport infrastructure 
should be based on community need and 
productivity enhancements, and not be reliant on 
selling profitable government entities. There is no 
sound public policy rationale for why the current 
debate about privatisation needs to be linked to 
state infrastructure plans.
Given the potential financial challenges facing 
the NSW Government’s budget position in the 
medium- to long-term, the government should be 
extremely hesitant about selling off its recurrent 
revenue streams in order to fund transport and 
other infrastructure projects. Measures other than 
electricity asset sales should and will need to be 
considered to strengthen the structural budget 
balance.
It is outside the scope of this project to recommend 
what these alternative revenue sources should 
be, though this report acknowledges the recent 
McKell Institute report – Getting us There: Funding 
the Transport Infrastructure of Tomorrow – as 
having a number of worthwhile recommendations 
that could easily support the delivery of transport 
infrastructure.
This report strongly recommends that the NSW Government leave electricity 
Transmission and Distribution assets in public ownership.
Given the potential financial challenges facing 
the NSW Government’s budget position in the 
medium- to long-term, the government should 
be extremely hesitant about selling off its 
recurrent revenue streams 
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Supporting these recommendations is a number of 
key findings contained within this report. 
THESE ARE AS FOLLOWS:
1.  Previous analyses supporting electricity 
privatisation have failed to compare public 
and private entities on a like-for-like 
basis. Once the analysis accounts for the 
important differences between networks, 
NSW’s publicly-owned T&D networks 
outperform their privately-owned peers on 
operating expenses: 
 A simplistic analysis confirms previous findings 
that operating expenditures are lower for 
privatised companies. However, after adjusting 
for costs that are incomparable across states 
and, more importantly, properly accounting for 
the physical span of the network, this result no 
longer holds. 
 To the contrary, this report found that private 
networks have higher overheads, and that these 
have been growing at a much faster rate than 
has been the case with public entities in NSW.
2. Privatising NSW’s Transmission and 
Distribution assets is likely to drive 
up prices due to higher overheads in 
comparable privatised businesses: 
 Benchmarking overheads against AusNet, 
the privately-owned Victorian Distribution 
company – which was deemed to be the 
most comparable privately-owned company 
based on physical span and the distribution 
of customers across city and rural areas – the 
report found that prices are likely to rise under 
privatisation. This directly contradicts recent 
arguments that suggest that privatisation will 
lead to lower prices. 
 Overheads are not only higher at the privately 
operated AusNet, they are also growing at 
a faster rate. Privatisation is likely to bring 
NSW overhead costs more into line with 
those witnessed at AusNet. It is expected 
that increased overheads would cost the 
average household $38 more in the first year 
of operation. When the faster rate of growth in 
these overhead costs is taken into account, the 
additional overhead cost per annum increases 
to around $103 a year within just 5 years. 
 When taken together, this report calculated 
that the average NSW customer is likely to 
end up paying nearly $350 more due to higher 
overhead costs resulting from privatisation. 
3. The physical span of different T&D 
networks is the single largest factor behind 
variations in both operational and capital 
expenditure:
 On opex, this report found that it was very 
important to account for the physical span of 
the network when comparing per customer 
costs. Around 88% of the variation in network 
upkeep costs per customer was directly 
attributable to the physical span of the network. 
 Other analyses have chosen to consider the 
relationship between opex and customer 
density, rather than between upkeep costs 
and physical span. This report argues that it 
has examined a superior and more intuitive 
relationship by focusing on physical span 
instead of customer density. Such an analysis 
accepts that the size of the network is a 
substantial driver of higher upkeep costs 
regardless of customer density. This is due to, 
for instance, a greater number of staff being 
required to service a larger number of poles, 
a greater area of impeding vegetation to be 
managed, and other such tasks.
the average NSW customer is likely to end 
up paying nearly $350 more due to higher 
overhead costs resulting from privatisation. 
On opex, ...Around 88% of the variation in 
network upkeep costs per customer was 
directly attributable to the physical span of 
the network. 
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 When examining capex, the report found that 
the physical span of the network was once 
again an important driver of variation in per 
customer costs – though this time accounting 
for around 50% of the variation. 
 The report also found that the alleged 
‘underperformance’ in NSW was in fact largely 
attributable to a spike in asset replacement 
and renewal costs, which in recent years has 
represented a far greater share of costs for 
these providers than the market median. For 
example, in the last regulatory period, Ausgrid 
spent 42% of its capex on asset renewal and 
replacement compared to a median of 21% for 
all Distribution companies across the National 
Electricity Market (NEM). Critically, NSW is now 
exiting its asset replacement peak and as such 
capex is unlikely to remain at current levels into 
the future. 
4. Publicly-owned T&D networks appear more 
willing to engage in long-term planning 
when undertaking capital expenditure: 
 This report finds that ignoring the physical span 
is an important reason for previous analyses 
mistakenly finding that private networks are 
more efficient in their network investments and 
operations. More importantly, this report finds 
that NSW has just emerged from a peak period 
in capital investment, investing $14.4B during 
the 2009-14 regulatory period.3 This was driven 
largely by the need for asset replacement and 
renewal in anticipation of future strains on the 
network, though these are now expected to 
moderate over coming years.4
 The report found that privatised networks 
are less able to pursue long-range capital 
investment strategies because of a competing 
requirement to provide steady returns for 
investors, a key expectation for privatised 
utilities. 
 As such, the report concludes that NSW’s 
networks would be more likely to deliver a 
rigid, inefficient capital investment plan under 
privatisation because of the differing incentives 
that exist for private entities compared with 
public entities.
5. Privatising NSW’s Transmission and 
Distribution assets offers little short-
term budgetary gain and could well be 
detrimental over a medium- to long-term 
horizon: 
 This report acknowledges the current low level 
of net debt in NSW when compared to other 
states and territories. Moreover, it should also 
be noted that that Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
only places a 10% weighting on debt in the 
determination of a state’s credit rating. 
 S&P places a significantly higher weighting on 
the ability of the NSW Government to keep 
expenses growth below revenue growth than 
it does on overall debt. This means that the 
loss of recurrent revenue could actually have 
a negative impact on credit ratings over the 
medium- to long-term, particularly given the 
NSW Government’s stated intention of recycling 
the capital back into new transport projects. 
 In 2013/14, self-generated revenue for NSW’s 
T&D assets equaled 120% of total expense, 
while, in contrast, self-generated revenue at 
RailCorp equaled just 29% of total expenses.5 
The NSW Government’s strategy effectively 
amounts to selling a dividend generating entity 
in order to fund the construction of transport 
projects that will likely require continuous 
subsidies from government. If so, this will have 
a negative impact on NSW’s credit rating, 
particularly given the higher weighting by the 
ratings agencies given to the government’s 
ability to keep revenue growth above expenses 
growth. While this report does not oppose 
investing in public transport, it does find that the 
NSW Government’s current plan of privatising 
S&P places a significantly higher weighting 
on the ability of the NSW Government 
to keep expenses growth below revenue 
growth than it does on overall debt.
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electricity to pay for such investments is not 
prudent.
 The medium-term budget outlook remains 
challenging. State expenses are forecast to rise 
following the Australian Government cuts to 
health and education. There is a risk that other 
revenue sources will grow less rapidly or even 
fall if there is any moderation in the housing 
market and a proportional reduction in taxes – 
including payroll tax – triggered by the ageing of 
the population and the worsening in the ratio of 
workers-to-non-workers. The report finds that 
the privatisation of T&D assets would reduce 
NSW Government revenue through the loss of 
dividends and interest payments. The report 
concludes that this is likely to be detrimental to 
state finances over the medium- to long-term, 
and concludes that the sale does not represent 
prudent budgetary management. 
 The report also find that the $20B figure that 
the NSW Government frequently cites as 
the amount the privatisation would yield is 
misleading, and that the proceeds from the sale 
are realistically only around $13B, or $11B if 
the asset recycling subsidy from the Australian 
Government is excluded.6 *
*This report note that the recent draft determination from the Australian Energy Regulator may reduce, in roughly equivalent 
portions, the sale value and the value of dividends to the government, though the determination remains subject to a community 
consultation process at the time of writing.
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Such a move should therefore 
be scrutinised very carefully, 
taking full account of the impact 
on households, businesses, and 
government finances. It is also 
important to rigorously test the 
assumption that a private operator 
will be able to operate efficiently 
within a natural monopoly context. 
This report seeks to provide that 
analysis. 
The NSW Government has 
indicated that it will privatise 49% 
of the state’s total T&D assets if 
it wins the NSW election in early 
2015. Whilst this may appear like 
an attempt to maintain majority 
control of these assets, this is not 
correct. This report notes that the 
49% figure is derived from the total 
value of all T&D assets including 
the Distribution company Essential 
Energy. 
However, since Essential Energy 
has been excluded from the 
privatisation, this means that 
the 49% will instead be made 
up through majority stake 
privatisations at Ausgrid, Transgrid 
and Endeavour Energy. 
Introduction
Over the past three decades, there has been a significant push towards the 
privatisation of government owned assets in Australia at both the commonwealth 
and state government levels. The electricity sector provides a recent illustration of this 
trend. In NSW, the Retail component of our electricity market has been privatised. The 
process of privatising Generation has already begun and is set to continue. Selling off 
the NSW Transmission and Distribution (T&D) network assets would represent the final 
stage in removing government control of this core essential service. 
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The most recent Auditor General’s report found 
that the state’s total T&D assets were worth a 
total of ~$31.2B, with 49% of these assets equal 
to ~$15.3B. Given that Ausgrid, Endeavour and 
Transgrid together have assets of ~$23.2B, a 49% 
sale of the total T&D assets in fact represents a 
~66% sale of these businesses, given the exclusion 
of Essential Energy.
Put simply, what might look like a plan for the NSW 
Government to retain majority ownership across 
the sector is in fact a plan to privatise two thirds of 
NSW’s T&D assets – excluding Essential Energy. 
This report also notes that the NSW Government 
has refused to rule out a 100% privatisation of 
these assets at some point following the partial 
privatisation.7 
The above ‘two thirds’ calculation should be viewed 
as an indicative rather than as a fixed figure. The 
total sale value for each asset will be determined 
by future expected revenue, with some companies 
achieving a higher sale price because of a more 
optimistic forward outlook. It is unlikely that the 
NSW Government will privatise each asset in equal 
proportions. 
A more likely scenario is that the NSW Government 
will retain a larger share of ownership in some 
companies and a smaller share in others.  
Nevertheless, across the sector as a whole, it is 
inevitable that the NSW Government will retain a 
minority share relative to the private sector. 
In essence, the NSW Government’s role will change 
from one of owner/operator to minority shareholder. 
The remaining value of the NSW Government’s 
ownership share will then be moved into a NSW 
Future Fund with the express purpose of funding 
the superannuation liabilities of the public service, 
while the proceeds of the sale will be used to fund 
new infrastructure (as opposed to debt or other 
financing measures).
There are two key pillars of the argument to 
privatise the T&D assets are: 
 That a privatised T&D network will operate more 
efficiently than the current regime, translating 
into lower electricity costs for consumers and 
businesses; 
 That the sale of the assets represents a fiscally 
responsible move, with the NSW Government 
using the proceeds to partially fund its planned 
major infrastructure projects. 
This report seeks to test these two assertions and 
examine whether they are borne out by data and 
economic reasoning. 
This report is split into two sections. The first 
section will examine the relative efficiency of both 
privately and publicly-owned T&D companies.  The 
second section will analyse both the short-term 
and longer-term impact of privatisation on NSW 
Government finances.
The report concludes that privatising NSW’s T&D 
assets will likely lead to inferior economic outcomes 
in the electricity market for households and 
businesses. 
The report also concludes that in the medium- to 
long-term, privatisation is likely to have perverse 
impacts on both the budget and the state’s credit 
rating. 
what might look like a plan for the NSW 
Government to retain majority ownership 
across the sector is in fact a plan to privatise 
two thirds of NSW’s T&D assets – excluding 
Essential Energy.
THE
McKell
Institute
18
In this first section, this report takes a fine-tooth 
comb to the costs of the various networks in 
the National Electricity Market – both privately 
and publicly-held. Our fact base is built from a 
combination of regulator data and a series of 
interviews with various industry participants. 
To better evaluate the impact on corporate 
efficiency from the privatisation of T&D assets, 
this report undertook a detailed analysis of the 
Operating Expenditure (‘opex’) and Capital 
Expenditure (‘capex’) at both private and publicly-
owned T&D companies across Australia. 
A simplistic examination of the data would appear 
to indicate that capex and opex are materially 
lower for the privately-held networks than the 
publicly-held networks. However, a different picture 
emerges once the data is examined in greater 
depth and at a more granular level. 
Where possible, this report attempts to ensure that 
comparisons between companies are undertaken 
on a like-for-like basis. For example, it would be 
inappropriate to compare the total expenditure of a 
Distribution company with a large physical span to 
a Distribution company with a small physical span. 
To address this, this report has examined the full 
spectrum of sub-components for both the opex 
and capex of each of the companies analysed. This 
in turn allows for a more accurate comparison of 
expenditures between companies. 
On opex, this report found that it was very 
important to account for the physical span of the 
network when comparing per customer costs. 
Around 88% of the variation in network upkeep 
costs per customer was directly attributable to 
the physical span of the network. This is intuitive – 
larger networks would be expected to have higher 
upkeep costs per customer. To compensate for 
this, this report has also compared costs on a per-
kilometer basis, thus removing any consideration of 
factors that are outside the control of a company – 
whether they are publicly or privately operated. 
In examining the specific sub-components of opex, 
the report also found that privately-owned networks 
have experienced significantly faster growth in 
‘overheads’ over the past 8 years – which includes 
items such as administrative staff, advertising 
and marketing costs, office costs, and executive 
remuneration.
When examining capex, the report found that the 
physical span of the network was once again an 
important driver of variation in per customer costs 
– though this time accounting for only around 50% 
of the variation. The report also found that the 
alleged ‘underperformance’ in NSW was in fact 
largely attributable to a spike in asset replacement 
and renewal costs, which in recent years has 
represented a far greater share of costs for these 
providers than the market median. Critically, NSW is 
now exiting its asset replacement peak and as such 
capex is unlikely to remain at current levels into the 
future. 
Methodology & Summary 
Findings for Section 1
In this first section, this report takes a fine-tooth comb to the costs of the various 
networks in the National Electricity Market – both privately and publicly-held. Our 
fact base is built from a combination of regulator data and a series of interviews 
with various industry participants. 
Around 88% of the variation in network up keep 
costs per customer was directly attributable to 
the physical span of the network.
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Interestingly, the report also found that NSW has 
historically experienced far greater cyclicality in its 
asset investments than was the case with privatised 
networks. Far from suggesting inefficiency, this 
report argues the difference in cyclicality is primarily 
due to the different incentives that exist for private 
and public companies. 
Private networks are incentivised to deliver a 
consistent capex program in order to deliver on their 
expectations as a utility investment – that is, stable 
but growing returns for investors. Government-
owned networks are less beholden to this 
requirement and therefore have greater flexibility to 
invest now for a longer-term horizon. Over the long-
term, this is likely to deliver better outcomes for end 
users on a cost-efficiency basis. 
Through discussions with suppliers, the authors of 
this report found that the capacity to undertake large 
scale asset replacement meant that government-
owned utilities can, and do, benefit from investment 
economies of scale, with further savings achieved 
through the rapid deployment of new, more efficient, 
cost-saving technologies. Privately-owned entities 
cannot capture these benefits without jeopardising 
their stability of returns, a trade-off that is unlikely to 
appeal to private investors. 
Given this, the added restrictions on investment 
capabilities that would result from the privatisation 
of T&D assets is likely to result in an overall negative 
outcome for capex cost efficiency. 
...privately-owned networks have 
experienced significantly faster growth in 
‘overheads’ over the past 8 years...
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The report examined the multiple ways in which 
the privatisation of T&D assets could potentially 
influence the state’s credit rating. This report 
considered whether the proposed partial sale of 
the assets could help, at the margin, to bolster the 
state’s credit rating.
This is unlikely to be the case if the proceeds 
of the sale are used to create new transport 
services that require recurrent state subsidies in 
order to cover the operating costs associated 
with those services. The NSW Government has 
announced that the proceeds of the sale will likely 
be used to create new rail projects. Because rail 
fares only recover 19.8% of the operating cost 
associated with train services, the creation of new 
rail infrastructure inevitably increases the recurrent 
liabilities associated with public transport.8 That 
is, the state will be required to provide costly and 
ongoing subsidies in order to keep public transport 
affordable. 
In this way, the NSW Government’s plan involves 
selling a profitable business in order to build a 
business that requires perpetual government 
subsidies. Trading recurrent revenue for recurrent 
liabilities will undoubtedly have a negative impact 
on NSW’s credit rating. This issue was covered in 
some depth by The McKell Institute’s recent report 
into the challenges of funding public transport 
infrastructure.
By selling off the T&D assets in order to fund 
infrastructure, it is true that the NSW Government 
could potentially reduce its debt in the short-term 
either by paying off existing debt or minimising the 
amount of debt required to fund its infrastructure 
projects. 
However, this report notes that major ratings 
agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) only places a 10% 
weighting on a state government’s overall debt 
levels when determining its credit rating. Moreover, 
the NSW Government already has a comparatively 
low level of net debt when benchmarked against 
other major Australian states. 
Given this, any possible positive impact associated 
with a temporary, one-off injection of cash sourced 
from the privatisation of electricity assets is likely 
to be quite modest. Furthermore, S&P also 
applies a 10% weighting to a state government’s 
contingent liabilities. Given this, any potential 
benefit associated with the sale of an asset would 
be easily offset by the recurrent contingent liabilities 
associated with the NSW Government’s proposed 
transport investment program.
Methodology & Summary 
Findings for Section 2
The second section of this report examines the short-term and medium- to long-
term budgetary implications of T&D privatisation. The report found little evidence 
to suggest that privatisation would result in a material or lasting improvement in 
NSW Government finances. This report examined the likely impact of the sale on 
the credit rating as well as the broader impact of privatisation on the state budget. 
Trading recurrent revenue for recurrent 
liabilities will undoubtedly have a negative 
impact on NSW’s credit rating.
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The report also considers the overall budgetary 
impact associated with dividends and tax 
equivalent payments foregone. These payments are 
a significant component of the state’s own-source 
revenues. In the 2014 Financial Year, the network 
businesses paid the NSW Government $1.7B, 
including $872M in dividends and $829M in income 
tax equivalent payments.9 Payments in the 2013 
Financial Year were also equal to $1.7B.10 
These payments represent a relatively stable and 
low-risk cash flow to the NSW budget each year. 
To put it in perspective, the $1.7B the NSW 
Government earns from the network businesses 
are equal to over 25% of payroll tax, 30% of 
transfer duties, and nearly 90% of taxes on 
gambling and betting.11 
Under the proposed privatisation, 49% of the 
dividend payments would be lost to the buyer(s) 
and 100% of the tax equivalent payments 
lost – with company tax paid to the Australian 
Government – equivalent to approximately $1.3B 
this Financial Year. 
The report concludes that such an approach 
would not be prudent given the scale of medium-
term fiscal challenges already confronting the 
NSW Government. According to the recent 
Commonwealth budget, the NSW Government 
is set to face a significant strain on expenses as 
a result of cuts to federal funding for health and 
education. 
In addition, the NSW Government’s revenue 
trajectory is vulnerable to the possibility of a 
significant slow-down – or even correction – in 
housing prices and housing activity in Sydney. 
Much of the recent strength seen in NSW 
Government budget figures is attributable to 
rising stamp duty receipts. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of this revenue stream weakening has 
become substantially more likely given the potential 
regulatory and/or interest-rate policy changes 
flagged by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). 
A slowdown in the housing market, if severe, could 
have a material impact on the state’s credit rating, 
given that keeping expense growth below revenue 
growth is also one of S&P’s major credit-risk 
criteria. 
Over the long-term, the ageing of NSW’s population 
is also expected to have a severe, detrimental 
impact on the fiscal strength of the state budget. 
Declining participation rates will put downward 
pressure on payroll tax receipts, while increased 
health and ageing expenditure is expected to 
unavoidably increase government spending. 
With shrinking revenue and growing budgetary 
risks already confronting the NSW Government, 
the decision to part with a non-volatile, reliable 
and recurrent dividend stream is not prudent in the 
long-run. 
The report acknowledges that investing in 
infrastructure is a worthwhile and productivity-
enhancing endeavor that ought to be encouraged. 
Nevertheless, state governments need to ensure 
that such investments are undertaken in a fiscally 
prudent manner. The sale of revenue generating 
assets to produce transport assets with recurrent 
liabilities does not meet this standard.
Weighing all these factors, the report disagrees 
with assertions that the privatisation of state-
owned electricity assets is prudent from a 
budgetary or credit rating perspective. The report 
recommends that the NSW Government abandon 
the sale and reconsider its strategy for the NSW 
electricity sector.
To put it in perspective, the $1.7B the 
NSW Government earns from the network 
businesses are equal to over 25% of payroll 
tax, 30% of transfer duties, and nearly 90% 
of taxes on gambling and betting. 
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Generation companies are those companies 
that are responsible for generating electricity, 
Transmission refers to the high-voltage energy 
infrastructure that carries power from the 
generators to the various Distribution networks, 
and Distribution refers to the lower-voltage 
energy infrastructure that carries power from 
the Transmission infrastructure to homes and 
businesses. Retail companies then compete 
against each other to competitively charge end 
users for access to the electricity that is produced 
via this system.
The Structure & Operation  
of the NSW Electricity Sector
In NSW, the electricity industry is separated into four sectors – Generation, 
Transmission, Distribution, and Retail. 
FIGURE 1:  ILLUSTRATION OF HOW THE ELECTRICITY MARKET WORKS
This system is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
In NSW, ACT, QLD, VIC, SA, and TAS, generators 
sell their energy into a National Electricity Market 
(NEM) which then determines the return for 
generators based on spot prices. Transgrid provides 
Transmission for NSW as well as the ACT. Distribution 
in NSW is provided by Ausgrid, Endeavour Energy, 
and Essential Energy, with the latter servicing more 
rural parts of NSW and Southern Queensland. Retail 
providers including Energy Australia, Origin Energy, 
AGL, TRUenergy, and others all compete directly for 
consumer and business accounts.
The level of privatisation within the electricity sector 
is mixed, both within NSW and in other jurisdictions. 
In NSW, the electricity Retail sector is completely 
privatised. A substantial proportion of the state’s 
electricity Generation is also privatised with further 
privatisation in the pipeline. T&D is currently under 
public ownership in NSW. Ownership of the T&D 
network also remains in public hands in QLD and 
Tasmania, whereas Victoria and South Australia 
have privatised their networks. 
Generation Transmission Distribution
Retailer
End user
ELECTRICITY FLOW 
PAYMENT 
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FIGURE 2: NETWORK PROVIDERS IN THE NEM12
Figure 2 below shows the regions covered by 
each T&D network, and indicates whether they 
are privately or publicly-owned. Note that each 
state in the National Electricity Market only has one 
Transmission company. 
Figure 2 also lists the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) 
for each company. The RAB represents the total 
value of all the capital assets that each network 
company holds. As is evident in the above table, 
whether public or private, the infrastructure 
investment that must be made in order to ensure 
reliable access to energy is significant. 
The substantial fixed costs associated with T&D 
infrastructure makes it inefficient for new competing 
entities to enter the market and establish rival 
networks where energy infrastructure already exists. 
As such, electricity T&D networks tend to operate 
under a natural monopoly structure, regardless of 
whether they are publicly or privately-owned. 
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In economic theory, a ‘natural monopoly’ refers to a 
firm whose fixed costs are sufficiently high that the 
benefits of competition in the market do not justify 
the presence of multiple players – that is, it makes 
economic sense to only have one player. 
Water supply is an excellent example – all else 
equal, having multiple players competing to provide 
you with water could theoretically push the price 
down, but this ignores the huge cost that would 
arise from building multiple competing damming, 
piping, and storage systems. The Transmission 
and Distribution of electricity is much the same.13 
Colloquially, this is often referred to as the ‘poles 
and wires’ of an electricity network, though in 
reality T&D infrastructure is substantially more 
diverse than that term would suggest. The massive 
capital infrastructure requirements associated with 
operating T&D networks ensures that the market 
will continue to operate in a natural monopoly 
context regardless of whether it’s publicly or 
privately-owned. 
The challenge with a natural monopoly is that in 
the absence of appropriate regulation, there is a 
disturbing degree of market power placed within 
just one company. When that company is providing 
an essential service that consumers simply cannot 
do without, the absence of regulation would 
provide that company with an enormous ability 
to exploit its natural monopoly status to ‘gouge’ 
consumers and businesses through excessive price 
rises. For this reason, these networks are typically 
‘regulated monopolies’. 
Methods for regulation differ from country to 
country, and in Australia’s case, from state to 
state. In the National Electricity Market, a ‘building 
block incentive-based’ approach is used to limit 
the power of these regulated entities.14 Here, the 
revenue that a network can earn over a regulatory 
period is set in advance and set equal to the 
estimated efficient cost of providing the network 
service for that period (the exact method for 
calculating allowed revenue is discussed in greater 
depth below). The network businesses are able to 
keep any difference between the allowed costs and 
their actual costs.
Because the level of revenue that each company 
can receive is fixed in advance, and because that 
level is based on the expected cost of providing 
each company’s respective electricity service, a 
substantial degree of forecasting of both opex and 
capex is involved. 
When determining the level of allowable revenue 
over a considered period, the Australian Energy 
Regulator uses a formula which provides 
companies with a reimbursement of opex, plus 
the multiplication of the Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital and the Regulated Asset Base over the 
period being considered, as well as reimbursement 
for depreciation of the RAB over the period. 
Though in reality the calculation is more complex,  
a simplified version of this formula is outlined in 
Figure 3. 
Natural Monopoly, Regulation 
& Revenue Determination
In economic theory, a ‘natural monopoly’ refers to a firm whose fixed costs are 
sufficiently high that the benefits of competition in the market do not justify the 
presence of multiple players – that is, it makes economic sense to only have one player. 
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FIGURE 3: HOW REVENUE IS DETERMINED FOR NETWORKS
DEFINITION OF 
THE WACC 
The Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital (WACC) refers to 
the cost of providing capital 
to a firm. It is calculated as 
the weighted average of the 
required rate of return on 
the various forms of capital 
that make up a company’s 
balance sheet (e.g. equity, 
debt, subordinated debt, 
and so on). In essence, it 
captures the necessary 
return a firm must make 
given its level of risk.
NSP revenue
Regulated Asset Base Weighted Average  Cost of CapitalOpex
Capex
Prices charged  
to consumers
NSP earns WACC multiplied by RAB each 
year (Depreciation is reimbursed)
Opex is reimbursed
Capex is the yearly addition  
to the Regulated Asset Base
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Normal Privatisation 
Arguments Do Not Apply  
to a Monopoly T&D Network
1. ‘BY NATURE’: One argument is that a 
privately-held firm will operate more efficiently 
purely as a result of not being publicly-held. For 
instance, the firm may be more likely to hold 
a culture of excellence or promote based on 
meritocracy. 
 This argument seems weak at best, and takes 
the efficiency of the market as an article of 
faith rather than an empirical and theoretical 
question to be thoughtfully examined on a 
case-by-case basis. Certainly anyone who has 
experienced the internal operations of a large 
company will know that it is a bold assumption 
to state that efficiency is in the DNA of privately-
owned firms. Recent examples from the Global 
Financial Crisis shows in practical terms how 
privately-owned banks and financial institutions 
in the US, UK, and throughout Europe were 
hopelessly inefficient and poorly managed. 
Indeed, many have made the case that it was 
actually a lack of government regulation and 
involvement in those sector which allowed the 
crisis to evolve to the point at which it would 
plunge the global economy into recession.
2. ‘BEATING FORECASTS’: The second 
argument is that privately-owned companies will 
have a stronger incentive to beat their forecast 
opex and capex over a particular regulatory 
period, and hence operate more efficiently. 
Revenue is determined for a regulatory period 
by the AER for a T&D network based on 
forecasts – if costs do not meet these forecasts, 
the firm will reap the difference as profit.
 It is, however, unclear why the same 
management principles would not apply 
to a publicly-owned firm. Even if a firm is 
publicly-owned, it still has a shareholder – the 
government – with efficiencies incentivised 
through the potential of stronger dividends for 
the budget. It’s also worth noting that in the last 
regulatory period, NSW outperformed its capex 
forecasts by $3.7B – that is, over 20%. The 
evidence suggests that this ‘beating forecasts’ 
argument is weak and not compelling.
The theoretical argument for privately-held T&D 
companies operating more efficiently than publicly-
held ones are not compelling or demonstrable. 
Fortunately, Australia has a ‘quasi-experiment’ 
– that is, a natural occurrence that in many ways 
resembles a controlled experiment – to draw 
from. While NSW, QLD and TAS all have publicly-
owned T&D networks, VIC and SA are privatised. 
In principle, one can therefore compare the relative 
cost-efficiency of networks in across the states and 
draw conclusions accordingly. 
As with any comparative analysis, the key is to 
control for differences between observations – that 
is, to ensure that the analysis does not compare 
‘apples with oranges’. In the instance of electricity 
privatisation, a failure to adequately account for key 
differences between the different entities appears 
to have led others to draw incorrect conclusions 
The argument for electricity privatisation hinges on two reasons for expecting 
privately-held firms to outperform their publicly-owned counterparts:
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around the relative efficiency of privatised T&D 
networks when compared with their public 
counterparts. 
After taking into consideration state-specific costs 
and the role of the physical span of the network, 
this report finds that there is no compelling 
evidence that privately-held Distribution companies 
outperform on opex per customer.  
This report also found that differences in capex 
per customer among Distribution companies was 
largely driven by network specific factors – primarily 
asset replacement and renewal – rather than 
ownership status. 
Similarly, this report found no compelling evidence 
for superior cost performance from privatised 
Transmission companies.
LIKELY BUYERS OF THE  
NSW NETWORK BUSINESSES 15 16 17
While bidding consortiums have not yet formed, a number of investors have been 
flagged as potential buyers for the NSW network assets. These include:
 Singapore Power
 Cheung Kong Infrastructure
 State Grid Corporation of China
 Spark Infrastructure
 DUET Group
 APA Group
 Various superannuation funds and fund managers in Australia and Canada, 
including Australian Super, Borealis, Queensland Investment Corporation, and 
Hastings Funds Management
Many of these businesses already operate within Australia’s broader T&D market. 
State Grid Corporation and Singapore Power together own AusNet – which 
possesses a Distribution and Transmission arm – and Jemena. Cheung Kong and 
Spark together own Citi Power, PowerCor and SA Power. Singapore Power and 
DUET Group own United Energy. State Grid Corporation and two investment 
funds own ElectraNet. Cheung Kong also has a substantial shareholding in 
Spark (approximately 9%), which in turn has a substantial shareholding in DUET 
(approximately 8%). 
Evidently, privatised network businesses in Australia are largely controlled by a 
small number of players, with the largest holdings owned by foreign governments 
and/or foreign companies.
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CONSUMER VIEWS
When considering whether the 
privatisation of a state’s T&D assets is a 
worthwhile endeavor, it is also important to 
consider the views of the consumers. 
In a 2013 poll of 1,801 NSW residents: 
 80% of respondents said that the 
electricity network should be owned 
by the public and operated by the 
government to benefit the community; 
 92% said that foreign companies should 
not be allowed to own important 
infrastructure such as NSW’s electricity 
network; 
 87% said that the issue of electricity 
privatisation would have some impact 
on how they vote at the next state 
election; and
 71% said that government would do 
a better job at running the electricity 
network than private companies.
This last point is of particular importance. 
According to the most recent reports from 
both the NSW and Victorian Energy and 
Water Ombudsmen, electricity complaints 
in privatized Victoria far outweigh 
those seen in NSW. In 2013/14, NSW’s 
Ombudsman received 30,349 complaints 
vs. Victoria’s 60,517 complaints. 
After adjusting for population, Victoria’s 
complaint rate is 250% of NSW’s.
This section will first provide a high-
level review of price trends in electricity 
networks over the past few decades, 
comparing states with publicly-owned 
network businesses to those with 
privately-owned businesses.  It will 
then consider the set of Distribution 
companies operating in the National 
Electricity Market. Cost comparisons 
are separated into opex and capex, 
with each considered in turn. 
Transmission companies will be 
considered at the end of this section, 
though conclusions are more difficult 
to draw due to the small number of 
data points, with only 5 companies to 
compare. 
This section will also compare the 
labour costs and overhead costs of 
public and private T&D companies. 
Network costs are murky 
The report currently being used by 
the NSW Government to support its 
push for privatisation has argued that 
the component of prices attributable 
to the network businesses is lower in 
Victoria than in NSW, and suggests that 
Victorian network prices are lower today 
(after excluding inflation) than they were 
in 1996.18 19  
For ease of reference, this report has 
reproduced the corresponding graphs 
from the report for both NSW and 
Victoria in Figure 4 below. While South 
Australia also offers a comparison point 
for privatised networks, the report only 
analysed this state up to 2010-11. As 
such, the South Australian comparison 
has not been reproduced below. 
Nevertheless, the following comments 
based on comparisons between 
Victoria and NSW would also hold when 
comparing NSW with South Australia.
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FIGURE 4: DRIVERS OF CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY PRICES OVER TIME20
When considering the above graphs, there are a 
few important observations that need to be made.
 First, excluding smart metering (‘AMI’) in 
Victoria means the report has excluded the 
cost of metering services for these businesses. 
Therefore, metering costs should also have 
been excluded from network costs in NSW, or 
AMI costs included in Victoria. They weren’t. 
The above analysis failed to ensure an adjusted 
comparison of the costs associated with 
different entities in different states. 
 Second, the start date chosen for the above 
analyses has substantial implications for any 
conclusions that should be drawn from it. It 
must be noted that network costs in Victoria 
began at a much higher base for the initial 
year of analysis, whereas NSW was achieving 
substantially lower network costs in 1996. 
Contrary to allegations that privatisation has 
led to increased efficiency in network costs, 
what the data actually shows is that between 
1996 and roughly the start of the last regulatory 
control period (2009), there was a convergence 
in network prices between the states. 
 Certainly, the data being used does not 
compellingly suggest that NSW costs would 
have fallen under privatisation, or equally 
that Victoria’s costs would not have fallen if 
the businesses had remained under public 
ownership.
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 Third, this analysis makes no attempt to take 
into account the physical span of the T&D 
networks in NSW. This is perhaps the most 
significant flaw in the above analysis. All else 
being equal, one would expect that the costs of 
NSW networks would be higher than Victoria’s 
due to the greater difficulty in maintaining a 
geographically dispersed network as well as 
the sheer cost of building longer lines and more 
substations. 
 With this in mind, the data would seem to 
suggest that Victoria has been playing ‘catch 
up’ to the NSW T&D network over the period 
being considered in the above analysis. This 
concept is explored further in later sections.
 Fourth, note that most of the divergence 
between network costs appeared over the last 
regulatory period in NSW. This period involved 
a substantial increase in capex from the NSW 
network businesses, largely driven by a need for 
asset replacement and renewal and to respond 
to government-mandated reliability standards. 
 As will be explored in later sections, NSW capex 
is forecasted to be substantially lower in the 
coming regulatory period, indicating the current 
trends are unlikely to continue with further 
convergence being the most likely outcome. 
Given the shortcomings in previous comparisons, 
this report has sought to provide a more 
appropriately detailed level of analysis by reviewing 
the drivers of cost differences at a more detailed 
level. This report draws on the detailed opex and 
capex data that is publicly available from the AER.
Simplistic ‘first glance’ analysis 
might suggests private networks 
have lower opex
The first step in comparing the relative opex of 
Distribution companies is to compare the data on a 
‘per customer’ basis. 
This report draws upon the recently available 
AER Economic-Benchmarking data for the period 
2006 to 2013. Figure 5 below shows the opex per 
customer by Distribution network for each year 
from 2006 to 2013. For each year, publicly-owned 
companies are grouped together in the six bars 
on the left, while privately-owned companies are 
grouped in the six bars to the right.
The below graph appears to show that opex per 
customer has been consistently lower for privatised 
companies compared to public companies. This 
result is consistent with past findings.21
FIGURE 5: OPEX PER CUSTOMER BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 22 23 
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Even if non-comparable costs  
are removed, the results  
appear to be similar
The above ‘per customer’ analysis is rudimentary in 
that it assumes that the customer profiles of different 
network are all identical. However, as has been noted 
previously in this report, it is critically important to 
assess the cost-efficiency of Distribution companies 
on a like-for-like comparison. A ‘per customer’ 
analysis does not achieve that.
The first step in achieving a like-for-like analysis is 
to exclude those costs that are state-specific. For 
instance, metering costs should be excluded from 
any comparative analysis given that these costs are 
reported differently in Victoria due to the AMI (smart-
meter) program. Other costs that should be excluded 
include state-specific taxes and penalties, insurance 
costs, and costs relating to corporate financing (e.g. 
debt management) as it is difficult to attribute these to 
the efficiency (or inefficiency) of the firm.
Figure 6 below attempts to provide a more 
appropriate comparison between entities by 
removing these excludable items. At this stage of 
the analysis, the numbers appear to be somewhat 
similar to those presented in Figure 5, with a 
noticeable gap remaining for ‘opex per customer’ 
between private and public distributors. 
It should, however, be noted that it was not possible 
to remove all of the exclusion-worthy costs due to 
aggregation in the AER data. 
FIGURE 6: ADJUSTED OPEX PER CUSTOMER 24 25  
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However, size absolutely matters 
– physical span accounts for 
most of the variation in upkeep 
costs between public and private 
companies
Both Figure 5 and Figure 6 continue to provide an 
overly-simplistic comparison between public and 
private entities because of one final and extremely 
important factor not already considered in the 
tables above. 
The major difference between distributors that 
has not yet been accounted for is the difference 
in physical span of the network – as measured by 
kilometres of route length. It is self-evident that a 
physically larger network will have higher operating 
expenditures. The cost to provide a utility to a 
disparate population is expected to be higher, in part 
because of the increased labour and transport costs 
associated with servicing a physically larger network. 
This report notes that companies which have 
a relatively small number of customers that are 
geographically dispersed would likely have a 
higher opex per customer, even if the company’s 
opex was just as efficiently managed as a different 
company with a larger number of customers 
operating in a more confined area. 
This report undertook to empirically examine the 
extent to which the operating expenditure of a 
distributor was driven by this ‘physical span’ factor. 
The analysis paid particular attention to those costs 
that were directly attributable to network upkeep 
– i.e. inspection, maintenance, repair, vegetation 
management, and so forth. 
The result was surprisingly strong. When a 
regression analysis of the impact of physical span 
on upkeep costs per customer was undertaken, 
there was a strong, simple and intuitively appealing 
correlation between network costs and line length. In 
other words, the greater the distance that has to be 
serviced, the higher the cost per customer of running 
the network upkeep aspect of the business.26 27  
The report found that 88% of the variation in opex 
per GWh was directly attributable to differences in 
the physical span of networks, regardless of their 
status as public or privately-owned entities.
The report found that 88% of the variation 
in opex per GWh was directly attributable 
to differences in the physical span of 
networks, regardless of their status as 
public or privately-owned entities.
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REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS:  
UNDERSTANDING 
THE IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE R2 FIGURE 
(ABOVE)
The R2 is a measure of the strength 
of the relationship between two 
variables. Specifically, it measures 
the extent of variation in the number 
of one variable (here, upkeep costs 
per customer) that can be attributed 
to another variable (here, the km 
line length of the network). An 
R2 of 88% is a very strong result, 
suggesting that the vast majority of 
the difference in upkeep costs per 
customer is actually attributable to 
differing physical span.
FIGURE 7: REGRESSION OF PHYSICAL SPAN ON UPKEEP COST PER CUSTOMER 28 29
Note that, while this report has presented 
the results for the latest year available in the 
data, a strong correlation was also clear 
when using data from previous years.
This report also notes that other analyses 
have chosen to consider the relationship 
between opex and customer density, 
rather than between upkeep costs and 
physical span. This report argues that it 
has examined a superior and more intuitive 
relationship by focusing on physical span 
instead of customer density. Such an 
analysis accepts that the size of the network 
is a substantial driver of higher upkeep 
costs regardless of customer density. This 
is due to, for instance, a greater number 
of staff being required to service a larger 
number of poles, a greater area of impeding 
vegetation to be managed, and other such 
tasks.
It is also important to recognise that NSW’s 
networks are not only larger, but also 
more energy intensive than almost all the 
privatised networks. This is attributable 
to a combination of factors, including 
greater gas use in Victoria, as well as the 
government-led smart-meter roll out.30
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FIGURE 8: ENERGY INTENSITY BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 31
Figure 8 below compares the megawatt hours (MWh) per customer of the different Distribution businesses in the 
NEM. Observe that the median energy intensity is much lower in Victoria than it is for Ausgrid and Endeavour. 
The higher energy intensity experienced on NSW 
networks inevitably translates into having more 
assets that require maintenance – for example, 
more substations. For this reason, and all else 
being equal, it is critical to note that maintenance 
costs would logically be higher in NSW than in 
other states. This would be true regardless of 
whether the entity was publicly or privately-owned. 
Previous analysis appears to have overlooked 
the impact of higher energy intensity on network 
upkeep costs. This report also notes that NSW’s 
Distribution businesses have a higher share of their 
network in underground assets, which are more 
costly to maintain.32
This report concludes that network upkeep costs 
should be excluded from any comparative analysis 
of the relative efficiency of different distributors, 
primarily because of the substantial differences 
in the physical span of networks, as well as other 
environmental factors such as energy intensity and 
the share of the network in underground assets. 
A failure to provide an analysis that appropriately 
excludes these costs runs a very serious risk of not 
comparing networks on a like-for-like basis. The 
following sections of this report attempt to provide 
a more nuanced and appropriate comparison of 
the cost factors affecting both public and private 
companies. 
The higher energy intensity experienced 
on NSW networks inevitably translates into 
having more assets that require maintenance 
– for example, more substations. 
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Labour costs: Public entities are 
competitive and efficient
During the interviews undertaken in the research 
process of this report, one potential explanation 
put forward to explain the variance in upkeep 
costs between public and private entities was the 
possibility that some states have more inflexible 
Enterprise Bargaining Agreements. 
Specifically, concerns were raised with the authors 
of this report that those states with publicly-
owned distributors – for instance, NSW – may 
have ‘less flexible’ provisions around contracting 
arrangements that protect workers but which also 
lead to higher costs. 
A high-level review of the labour markets and EBAs 
in the relevant States did not support this assertion. 
In particular, this report notes that:
 There is no clear relationship between 
contractor restrictions and the ownership 
status of networks across states. 
 The typical provisions in EBAs require 
contractors to specifically match the safety, 
performance and industrial standards for 
contractors to the standards that already exist 
for non-contract employees. This provision 
holds both in states with publicly-held 
businesses (such as NSW) and privately-held 
businesses (such as Victoria).
 There is no clear relationship between 
contractor utilisation and costs across 
States. 
 This report notes that Tasmania’s Distribution 
business has relatively low upkeep costs per 
customer and yet that state also has a very 
low contractor utilisation. This contrasts with 
claims that a largely non-contract workforce will 
automatically result in higher upkeep costs. 
 More generally, this report found that 
labour was more expensive in states with 
privately-owned businesses. 
 This report found that non-managerial labour 
was significantly more expensive in the Victorian 
electricity market than in NSW, with average 
weekly cash earnings of around $2,330 in Victoria 
compared to $1,970 in NSW.33 This contradicts 
the assertion that upkeep costs are higher in 
those states with publicly-owned Distribution 
networks because of some alleged ‘inflexibility’ 
within the T&D workforces of those states. 
After considering these findings, this report 
concluded that recent arguments suggesting 
that privatisation will achieve lower upkeep 
costs through a private-sector led ‘workforce 
restructuring’ are flawed. 
Physical span will continue to account for most 
of the variance in upkeep costs per customer, 
regardless of whether an entity is publicly or 
privately-owned.
Administration costs:  
Private companies underperform 
against public entities
Excluding network upkeep costs paints a very 
different picture of the relative efficiency of NSW’s 
distributors. Figure 9 plots the remaining opex per 
customer for each distributor once these factors 
are stripped out from the analysis. 
Observe that the privatised networks appear to be 
operating less efficiently than most of the publicly-
owned networks. In fact, the lowest overhead 
networks are found at publicly-owned companies, 
while the highest overhead costs are found at 
privately-owned companies.
What Figure 10 analysis shows is that, once 
physical span and other state specific factors 
are excluded, operating expenditure is higher in 
privatised states than in non-privatised states. 
Equally as important, these expenses are growing 
faster in privatised states, indicating that NSW T&D 
companies are actually operating more efficiently 
than their Victorian counterparts. 
There is no compelling evidence to support the 
argument that NSW would automatically improve 
the efficiency of its operating expenditure if its T&D 
assets were privatised. 
In fact, the opposite is likely to be true, with less 
efficient outcomes resulting in higher costs for end 
users.
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FIGURE 9: COMPARING OPEX AFTER EXCLUDING UPKEEP COSTS 34
FIGURE 10: GROWTH IN OVERHEADS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION BUSINESSES 35
Moreover, as Figure 10 below shows, these costs have grown at a substantially faster rate in the privatised states 
than has been the case in NSW. 
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Publicly-owned firms are not afraid 
to undertake capex when it is 
needed
In a similar vein to our opex analysis, this report has 
compared the capex per customer of the various 
network providers. 
As occurred with opex, preliminary evidence would 
appear to suggest a higher capex per customer for 
public networks. 
As noted in the previous section of this report 
however, energy intensity varies significantly across 
the states. While it was most intuitive to compare 
operating expenses on a per customer basis, it 
is substantially more accurate to examine capex 
in terms of cost per GWh. This is because the 
required investment for one given network will not 
be the same as for another network if the energy 
intensity of each network’s customers is different. 
This holds true even if both networks have an equal 
number of customers.  Consideration must also 
be given to state based reliability standards which 
contribute to Capex requirements.
Figure 12 below shows Capex per GWh for the 
various Distribution businesses. Note here that the 
divergence between private and public networks 
is much less clear, though on average NSW’s 
networks do appear to have been spending more 
on capex, particularly in the last few years.
FIGURE 11: CAPEX PER CUSTOMER 36 
FIGURE 12 –  CAPEX PER GWH 37
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FIGURE 13: REGRESSION OF CAPEX PER GWH ON PHYSICAL SPAN 38 
As with opex, this report was interested in 
examining the relationship between capex and the 
physical span of the network. All else being equal, 
the cost of meeting a given level of demand for 
electricity will in a large part depend on the physical 
span of the network. This is because longer 
lines and more substations would be required to 
deliver the same amount of power across a more 
geographically dispersed network. 
When determining the impact of physical span on 
capex, the report found that 50% of the variation 
in capex per GWh was directly attributable to 
differences in the physical span of networks, 
regardless of their status as public or privately-
owned entities. 
This suggests that a substantial portion of the 
difference in capex across public and private 
networks can be directly attributed to physical 
span. Again, this report notes that the below results 
are replicable for previous years, and in fact were 
even stronger in some previous years.
This report also sought to understand what has 
been driving the remaining variation in capex 
per customer across states. In undertaking this 
analysis, the report found that Ausgrid spent a 
significantly higher share of its capex on asset 
replacement and renewal compared to the median 
of all Distribution companies. In the last regulatory 
period, Ausgrid spent 42% of its capex on asset 
renewal and replacement compared to a median 
of 21% for all Distribution companies.39 Endeavour 
also spent a higher proportion of its capex on asset 
replacement and renewal, with 25% of total capex 
dedicated to this task. 
As discussed in Box 5, asset renewal can be a 
highly costly exercise, and yet the scale of renewal 
required can be hidden by looking at overall figures 
for remaining asset lives – for instance, due to large 
one-off expenses such as the building or replacing 
of substations. In this way, it is important to 
consider when particular assets are being replaced, 
rather than just taking an ‘aggregate’ perspective of 
capex, remaining asset lifespan, and/or the size of 
the Regulated Asset Base.
During the interview process of this report, the 
authors sought further clarification on this point 
from a key supplier of network assets. The supplier 
the report found that 50% of the variation 
in capex per GWh was directly attributable 
to differences in the physical span of 
networks, regardless of their status as 
public or privately-owned entities.
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explained that over the past few years, Ausgrid 
has spent a large amount of money replacing its 
old assets with 33Kv assets, which, while involving 
a significant short-term cost, will put the network 
in a very strong position going forward. This would 
indicate that the higher capex of NSW companies is 
actually intended to deliver greater efficiencies in the 
long-run, with lower costs projected for future years.
This report also notes that the NSW Government’s 
own report on the topic has indicated that Victoria 
and South Australia may need to engage in 
significant asset renewal in coming years due to the 
life cycle stage of some of their assets.40 This would 
indicate that Victoria is likely to see an increase 
in capex at the same time that NSW is seeing a 
decrease. Such factors are of critical importance 
when considering the recent capex performance of 
both public and private entities.
This report also notes that NSW Distribution 
companies have in recent years operated under 
more stringent reliability and safety regulations 
that have also contributed to higher Capex 
requirements, though these are set to ease in 
the future. Nevertheless, this report undertook an 
examination of recent NSW capex to determine 
whether increased investments had led to improved 
reliability outcomes for end users.
An examination of the frequency and duration of 
interruptions in NSW – using both the System 
Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) 
and the System Average Interruption Duration 
Index (SAIDI) – found that reliability standards 
have certainly improved in NSW following recent 
investments in T&D networks. 
Notably, each index had a substantially lower value 
in 2013 than was the case in 2008 – i.e. before the 
start of the last regulatory period.41 This means that 
consumers in NSW now experience higher levels of 
...consumers in NSW now experience higher 
levels of reliability, less frequent outages, and 
outages that are shorter in duration.
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reliability, less frequent outages, and outages that 
are shorter in duration. 
The one exception is with Essential, which enjoys 
a lower frequency of outage (SAIFI), but which is 
yet to achieve a lower duration of outage when 
those less frequent outages do occur (SAIDI). In 
explaining that, this report notes that Essential has 
seen a lower proportion of recent capex dedicated 
to asset replacement and renewal than has been 
the case in other NSW companies.
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that more stringent 
reliability requirements have been a key driver of 
higher capex in NSW in recent years. This is not itself 
a bad thing, it simply reflects that customers in NSW 
have been paying extra for substantial improvements 
in the reliability of their electricity.
It is beyond the scope of this report to examine 
in detail the technical elements of the various 
Distribution companies’ investment programs, but 
in relation to capex, there are two important points 
to note. 
The first point, ascertained from discussions with 
asset suppliers, is that preferential pricing typically 
does not occur in this market. Preferential pricing is 
when one purchaser is offered a better price or rate 
on all or part of their business. This report found 
that T&D companies were not given different prices 
for network assets depending on whether the 
organisation was publicly or privately-owned. 
What does occur is discounts for large-scale 
purchases. This would indicate that larger publicly-
owned networks engaging in major asset renewal 
programs – for instance, in NSW – are better able 
to secure lower cost unit prices when purchasing 
network assets. More importantly, there is no 
evidence to suggest that privately-owned networks 
would be able to outperform publicly-owned-
networks when it comes to negotiating supplier 
costs.
The second point to note is that the AER employs 
a team of consultants to review in detail each 
Distribution company’s capital investment plan 
for each regulatory period. Through an iterative 
process, the AER and the Distribution companies 
thus reach an agreed allowance for capex over the 
period. 
In the absence of any data to the contrary, it 
should therefore be assumed that any excessive 
capex over the recent peak cycle in NSW’s capital 
investment would have been picked up by this 
process. Similarly, it should also be assumed that 
any excessive capital investments by a privately-
held company would be equally likely to be picked 
up by the regulator. 
However, insufficient investments to meet the 
longer-term needs of the network would presumably 
be more difficult for the regulator to assess. This 
argument is examined in further detail below.
Publicly-owned firms have more 
cyclical investment cycles because 
they prioritise investment efficiency 
larger publicly-owned networks engaging 
in major asset renewal programs...are better 
able to secure lower cost unit prices when 
purchasing network assets. More importantly, 
there is no evidence to suggest that privately-
owned networks would be able to outperform 
publicly-owned-networks when it comes to 
negotiating supplier costs
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Publicly-owned firms have more 
cyclical investment cycles because 
they prioritise investment efficiency 
over steady dividend streams for 
private investors
Through discussions with the AER, the authors 
found that government-owned Distribution 
companies have historically seen much greater 
cyclicality in their capex than their privately-
owned companies. This is particularly true for the 
comparison between NSW and Victoria. 
This report contends that the differing investment 
cycles are likely linked to a greater willingness of 
public firms to undertake large-scale capex when 
there is a clear need. This provides a clear benefit 
to the consumers of electricity and to the long 
term efficiency of the company’s capital investment 
strategy. In contrast, privately owned firms are more 
likely to defer important capex in order to meet the 
demands of private shareholders who generally 
expect less volatile profits and dividends.
The last regulatory period in NSW shows a clear 
peak in the NSW T&D investment cycle. Figure 
14 below shows a marked downturn in capex 
per customer in NSW in the final two years of 
the regulatory period, with the effect particularly 
pronounced for Ausgrid. Furthermore, capex per 
customer is expected to be substantially lower for 
all three NSW Distribution companies in the coming 
regulatory period.
FIGURE 14 – NSW CAPEX CYCLE 42 
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This report notes that, given the AER’s draft 
determination, capex will probably be even lower in 
NSW than forecasts presented in Figure 14 (though 
at the time of writing the determination is yet to 
go through the required community consultation 
process).43
This report considered why public companies 
have greater cyclicality of capex than their private 
counterparts.   
One argument could be that public networks are 
more open to government influence and therefore 
tend to have less consistent capital investment 
plans. However, the components of capex that are 
directly attributable to regulation were somewhere 
in the order of just 10-20% of total capex in NSW in 
this last regulatory period.44 This would suggest that 
government influence is not a leading factor behind 
the greater variance in public sector capex relative to 
that of the private sector. 
What is substantially more likely to influence the 
differing degrees of cyclicality is the differing incentives 
driving publicly and privately-owned networks. Many 
investment funds and other shareholders choose to 
buy equity in utility stocks because they represent 
a low-risk asset that provides a steady stream of 
dividends. A utility stock with volatile dividends driven 
by large and irregular capex spending would not 
be well received by the market with its share price 
suffering as a result.
At these privately-owned networks, the key question 
for management then becomes ‘how do we deliver 
the highest-possible consistent stream of dividends?’ 
Given the revenue framework that prevails in the 
National Electricity Market – where the profits of a 
utility company are determined by the size of the 
RAB – and therefore the level of capex undertaken – 
it is self-evident that the investment strategy that is 
most likely to be well received by shareholders would 
be to simply maintain a consistent, non-volatile 
capex program over time. 
This remains true even if there are cost efficiencies 
and savings to be gained through a more cyclical 
investment strategy. There is no reason to believe 
that this would correspond to the lowest long-term 
capex – in fact, the economic incentive is actually the 
reverse. In essence, a trade-off has been accepted 
whereby lower volatility is prioritised over investment 
cost efficiency. 
Publicly-owned utilities are less exposed to these 
requirements because the shareholder – the state 
government – is not as concerned with a non-volatile 
dividend stream, and as such, is more tolerant of 
a cyclical investment strategy if it achieves better 
outcomes for people in the state in the long-run. This 
points a very different light on recent cost drivers in 
NSW Distribution such as Ausgrid’s asset renewal 
and replacement program – these may in fact 
represent the optimal outcome for the customer over 
the long-term.
Overall, it is clear that a large part of the increases in 
electricity prices in NSW over the past few years can 
be attributed to an uptick in capital investment by 
Distribution networks. However, this report rejects the 
hypothesis that customers would have been better off 
under a privatised ownership structure.
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In NSW, capex is broken down 
into five categories:
1. DEMAND AUGMENTATION: This refers to 
the increase in the regulated asset base that 
is necessary to keep pace with increased 
demands for electricity. Importantly, 
Distribution (and Transmission) networks 
must keep pace not with total demand on the 
network, but rather with peak demand (the 
highest period of demand on the network). 
This is because the system fails (i.e. blackouts 
occur) when demand exceeds peak supply. 
 Moreover, it is not just overall peak demand 
that networks need to be concerned with, 
but also peak demand on particular parts of 
the network. For instance, if peak demand is 
expanding at a faster rate in regional areas 
than in metropolitan areas, capital expenditure 
on those arms will have to increase in 
response. Simply examining trends in overall 
peak demand for a particular network will not 
necessarily reveal the necessary increase in 
capital expenditure, particularly for networks 
that are more geographically disparate.
2. ASSET RENEWAL AND REPLACEMENT: This 
refers to the capital expenditure required to 
replace existing components of the network 
that either have completed their lifespan or 
are no longer sufficient for the needs of the 
network. There are different types of assets 
that make up a Distribution network: overhead 
Distribution assets less than 33kV (wires and 
poles); overhead Distribution assets more 
than 33kV (including towers); underground 
Distribution assets less than and more 
than 33kV (cables and ducts); Distribution 
substations; substations; easements; and 
others. 
 The challenge is that there is substantial 
variance in the cost per unit of these different 
asset types. For instance, while one can look 
at the remaining lifespan for the poles and 
wires network across different Distribution 
companies to develop a picture of necessary 
replacement costs, the fact is that replacing 
just one substation is an incredibly expensive 
exercise - looking at the overall lifespan for 
such assets risks drawing incorrect conclusions 
due to too much aggregation of the data.
3. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY: This refers 
to the augmentation of the network that a 
Distribution company must engage in to meet 
the state-specific regulatory requirements for 
reliability and quality.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY: There 
are important environmental and safety 
considerations in Distribution (and 
Transmission) networks. One that is 
particularly poignant for NSW is fire risk. 
Distribution companies must undertake regular 
capital investments to minimise such risks.
5. NON-SYSTEM ASSETS: This item refers to 
other expenses counted in capex, such as 
motor vehicles.
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No clear evidence of publicly-
held Transmission companies 
underperforming
This report also reviewed the opex and capex of 
Transmission companies in the National Electricity 
Market. Unfortunately, the limitation of this analysis 
to just 5 data points makes it more difficult to draw 
strong conclusions. Nevertheless, the evidence 
again suggests that private companies do not 
outperform their public counterparts on either opex 
(after excludable items) or capex.  
Figure 15 below opex per km line after excludable 
items – shows that in recent years Transgrid 
has typically performed somewhere in-between 
ElectraNet and AusNet – the two privately-owned 
Transmission networks. Even at a rudimentary level 
of analysis, the data does not suggest that Transgrid 
would necessarily operate with lower opex under 
private ownership.
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FIGURE 15: COMPARISON OF OPEX OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRANSMISSION NETWORKS 46 
FIGURE 16: COMPARISON OF CAPEX OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSMISSION NETWORKS 47 
Note that this report has decided to use costs per kilometre of line length in the below, rather than per customer, 
as the latter is a less relevant metric for Transmission networks given that they do not provide power directly to an 
end customer. This report was unable to compare the networks on a GWh basis due to gaps in the data available.
Figure 16 below also compares capex per kilometre of line length for the different Transmission companies. The 
data shows that that there has been a high degree of variability in the capex of Transmission companies over 
recent years. This is likely driven by the nature of the Transmission assets, with investments being delivered 
through large and discrete costs. 
Again, there is no clear pattern of Transgrid underperforming on costs relative to the private networks. While capex 
was materially higher in 2009 for Transgrid relative to ElectraNet and AusNet, observe that ElectraNet (privately-owned) 
spent roughly double Transgrid’s capex in 2012. 
The data provides no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Transgrid’s capex performance would improve under 
privatisation. In fact, for similar reasons to those that were outlined when comparing public and private Distribution 
companies, privatisation could introduce new incentives that actually worsen outcomes for end users in the long-run. 
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Households are set to  
pay more under privatisation
Previous analyses that have attempted to 
determine the impact of privatisation on household 
bills by simply comparing how network costs have 
changed in NSW and Victoria are limited. These 
analyses are too simplistic and undermined by 
failing to compare the companies on a like-for-like 
basis. 
As discussed earlier, previous analysis has failed to 
acknowledge that network costs were at a much 
higher level in Victoria at the time of privatisation 
than they were in NSW.48 It would be reasonable to 
expect costs would have moderated whether the 
company was public or private. 
Moreover, this report has also outlined how the 
differing physical span of the Victoria’s and NSW’s 
T&D networks means the costs associated with 
those network businesses will naturally be higher 
in NSW than Victoria, all else equal. This would 
be true regardless of whether NSW entities are 
operating under a public or private ownership 
structure. This critical factor has also been missed 
in previous analysis.
Finally, the recent need for asset renewal and 
replacement, as well as changes in regulatory 
standards, have both led to higher capex in NSW 
over recent years. Consumers have received 
significant enhancements in reliability as a result of 
these investments, while the network has been set 
up to be able to respond to future requirements on 
part of the network. 
In contrast to recent claims by the NSW 
Government, the evidence suggests that prices are 
in fact likely to be higher under privatisation in the 
long-run.
There is no evidence to suggest that capex will be 
more efficiently delivered under privatisation. This 
report also notes that NSW T&D companies have 
forecasted lower investment in capital over the 
next regulatory period, as the major upgrades and 
investments have largely already been undertaken 
over the past 5 years. In addition, given that private 
operators have an added requirement to deliver 
constant and steadily growing dividends, it is 
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reasonable to expect that the capex component 
of prices would be at least as high, and perhaps 
even higher, for privatised companies than public 
companies over coming years. 
Forecasting a precise value for this would be 
fraught with difficulties and is beyond the scope of 
this report. Nevertheless, the broader incentives 
and existing regulatory framework for determining 
returns is well known, and as such, the broader 
investment trends for private companies vs. public 
companies is clear. Utility companies have a more 
restricted investment capacity because of the 
trade-off required to ensure less volatility in the 
dividends provided to private shareholders. In 
contrast, public companies are able to invest with 
greater flexibility. 
Public companies put a higher premium on cost 
efficiency, whereas private companies have added 
restriction imposed by the need to ensure less 
volatility in their investment strategy. 
There is absolutely no reason to believe network 
upkeep costs would be lower under a private 
model than a public one. As examined throughout 
this report, upkeep costs are heavily dependent on 
the physical span of networks as well as the level of 
energy intensity. These costs could fall if privatised 
networks began to provide less servicing to more 
remote parts of the network, which would likely 
lead to more frequent and lengthier power failures. 
Provided the existing reliability standards are 
maintained, all else being equal, there is nothing to 
suggest that upkeep costs would be lower or more 
efficient under privatisation. 
The only area where a change in 
ownership would likely result in a change 
in electricity bills would come from 
changes in overhead expenses – including 
but not limited to changes in costs 
associated with administrative staffing, 
advertising and marketing, offices, and 
executive remuneration
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The only area where a change in ownership 
would likely result in a change in electricity bills 
would come from changes in overhead expenses 
– including but not limited to changes in costs 
associated with administrative staffing, advertising 
and marketing, offices, and executive remuneration 
– as the formerly publicly-owned businesses 
change their operating model to better align with 
other private organisations.
A preliminary comparison between the weighted 
average overhead costs per customer in NSW 
(excluding Essential Energy customers) and the 
weighted average overhead costs per customer in 
Victoria results in figures that are broadly similar.49 
However, this approach is simplistic and does not 
account for critical differences between the different 
T&D companies. 
For example, Citipower has a very small physical 
network span and services the CBD and Urban 
areas exclusively, whereas both Ausgrid and 
Endeavour are relatively large networks that have a 
much higher proportion of their customers on Short 
Rural lines. This involves, for instance, more staff 
and divisional offices. 
To provide an appropriate comparison between 
public and private entities, this report reviewed the 
various privatised networks to determine which 
company would provide the best comparison point. 
This report decided on AusNet for the following 
reasons:
1. It has a physical network that is reasonably 
close in size to Ausgrid and Endeavour;
2. It has a substantial share of its business on 
Short Rural lines; and
3. It is owned by Singapore Power and State 
Grid Corporation of China, which are touted 
as two potential buyers for the NSW network 
businesses (see Box 2)
Privately-owned AusNet has both higher overhead 
costs and faster growth in its overhead costs than 
comparable, publicly-owned companies in NSW. 
Using AusNet as the comparative point, this report 
calculated that overhead costs per customer would 
increase for the average NSW customer – on the 
FIGURE 17:  
HIGHER OVERHEAD COSTS FOR AUSGRID AND ENDEAVOUR CUSTOMERS UNDER PRIVATISATION
Privately-owned AusNet has both higher overhead 
costs and faster growth in its overhead costs than 
comparable, publicly-owned companies in NSW.
The difference in overheads is illustrated in Figure 17 below. 
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FIGURE 18: THE RISING COST OF PRIVATISATION OVER TIME
Ausgrid or Endeavour networks – by approximately 
$38 a year, assuming that privatisation leads to a 
broader restructuring that would bring costs more 
into line with those at AusNet.
When the faster rate of growth in these overhead 
costs is taken into account, the figure increases to 
around $103 a year within just 5 years. 
When taken together, this report calculates that the 
average NSW customer could end up paying nearly 
$350 more through higher overhead costs over a 
total 5 year timeframe.
The rising cost of privatisation to the average 
customer on the Ausgrid or Endeavour networks is 
illustrated in Figure 18 below.
This report has focused on average costs per 
customer, rather than separating out household 
and business customers, in order to minimise 
assumptions imposed.
Contrary to promises that privatisation will lead 
to more efficient outcomes, the higher and faster 
growing overhead costs at privately-owned AusNet 
strongly suggests that privatisation is likely to result 
in higher costs. These costs are inevitably passed 
on to end users. 
If Ausgrid and Endeavour were to experience similar 
overhead costs to their most comparable private 
counterpart, the result of privatisation would be a 
substantial increase in the financial burden placed 
on NSW households and businesses.50 51 
If Ausgrid and Endeavour were to 
experience similar overhead costs to their 
most comparable private counterpart, 
the result of privatisation would be a 
substantial increase in the financial burden 
placed on NSW households and businesses. 
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Detailed Findings: 
Section 2 – Consequences  
for the Budget
The second key component of the argument for privatisation relates to the 
management of government finances.
Specifically, the current NSW Government has 
argued in favour of ‘recycling’ the revenue from 
privatising its network assets in order to better 
position its balance sheet for planned investments 
in other infrastructure areas – principally transport. 
This strategy translates into either using the 
funds to minimise future debt arising from the 
infrastructure investment, and/or paying down 
existing debt with the proceeds from the asset sale. 
As the NSW Government rapidly expands its 
infrastructure expenditure, consideration must be 
given to how the government will actively keep its 
risk-exposure down while maintaining the faith of 
investors – equivalently, its credit rating.
This section of the report will examine this topic 
in detail. Specifically, this report will address the 
following questions:
1. What is the likely short-term impact of the sale 
on the budget? 
2. What is the likely medium- to long-term 
impact?
Short-term budgetary benefits  
are likely very modest
By using the lump-sum revenue from the sale, 
the NSW Government is hoping to minimise the 
debt required to fund its planned infrastructure 
investments. The argument is that this represents 
a more prudent budgetary strategy as lower state 
debt should support the NSW Government’s credit 
rating.
NSW T-Corp, the central borrowing authority of the 
NSW Government, is currently rated triple-A with 
a stable outlook – the highest possible rating – by 
Moody’s Investors Service while its rating is triple-A 
with a negative outlook by agency Standard & 
Poor’s. 
With the recent prolonged period of subdued, low 
inflationary economic growth, state government 
budgets have come under increasing pressure. 
However, amid that fiscal tension, the NSW 
Government has been able to hold its favorable 
credit position through a combination of moderate 
spending growth and increased revenue arising 
from the continuing strength of Sydney’s residential 
property market.
According to NSW T-Corp,52 S&P bases its credit 
rating assessment on seven elements, with each 
weighted according to their relative importance. 
These are: the economy (20%); financial 
management (20%); liquidity (20%); budget 
flexibility (10%); budget performance (10%); debt 
...the level of net debt only represents a 
10% weighting in the determination of 
NSW’s credit rating. 
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(10%); and contingent liabilities (10%).
This report does not dispute the claim that a 
low level of net debt for NSW is important in 
maintaining its triple-A rating. However, this report 
also notes that the level of net debt only represents 
a 10% weighting in the determination of NSW’s 
credit rating. 
As demonstrated in figure 19 below, it can be seen 
that NSW already has the lowest level of net debt 
out of NSW, VIC, QLD, and WA and debt levels are 
forecast to remain low over the period to 2018. 
Given the comparatively low level of net debt in 
NSW, coupled with the fact that S&P only places 
a 10% weighting on debt as a determinant of the 
credit rating, it would seem that the case for yet 
lower debt as a means of underpinning the credit 
rating in the future is low to moderate at best. 
The state’s economic performance and on-going 
budget management are more important to the 
credit rating. 
T-Corp specifically states that government expense 
control is “the key to NSW bolstering its AAA 
rating”.54 The evidence would therefore suggest 
that the NSW Government’s success in keeping 
revenue above expenses in recent years, as well as 
the projections for this to continue going forward 
(figure 20 below), are much more significant factors 
behind the state’s ability to maintain a triple-A credit 
rating. This would imply that a further lowering of 
debt levels through the privatisation of T&D assets 
is unlikely to register as an important consideration 
for ratings agencies as they reassess the state’s 
credit rating.
FIGURE 19: NSW DEBT LEVELS IN COMPARISON TO OTHER STATES 53
FIGURE 20: COMPARING EXPENSE AND REVENUE GROWTH IN NSW 55
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Medium- to long-term impacts likely 
to be detrimental as payments dry up
Currently, NSW’s T&D companies provide dividend 
income to the NSW Government, as well as income 
tax equivalents (company tax would otherwise flow 
to the Australian Government). In the 2014 Financial 
Year, dividends paid by the publicly owned network 
businesses totaled just over $872M, while tax 
equivalent payments were $826M.56 This resulted in 
a total distribution to the NSW Government of $1.7B 
in the 2014 Financial Year, with $1.7B also paid to 
the government in the 2013 Financial Year.57 
This represents a relatively stable cash flow injection 
to the NSW budget each year. To put the scope of 
this cash flow into context, the payments made by 
T&D companies to the NSW Government represent 
an amount that corresponds to roughly 25% of 
payroll tax, 30% of transfer duties, and nearly 90% 
of taxes on gambling and betting. 
If the current proposal goes through, 49% of these 
dividends and 100% of tax equivalent payments – 
totaling of $1.3B in cash payments – will disappear 
from the NSW Government’s budget balance 
sheets and will instead be paid to private sector 
shareholders and the Commonwealth.
The NSW Government has estimated that it will 
receive around $20B as a result of the sale of 
the T&D assets.58 This figure was determined in 
part by the expected proceeds of the sale, in part 
by the result of a payment under the Australian 
Government’s ‘asset recycling incentive’ program, 
and in part by the interest that is expected to be 
earned on the capital amount over the construction 
period of the infrastructure.59
This report finds the $20B in proceeds claimed by 
the NSW Government for the privatisation of T&D 
assets to be a significant over estimation.
UNDERSTANDING   
THE VALUATION 60
UBS has calculated the total value of the NSW 
network businesses at between $21.3B and 
$22.2B, after debt of $18.6B has been paid 
off. This implies that the NSW Government’s 
proposed privatisation of 49% of the assets 
should generate between $10.7B and $11.1B. 
Typically, such valuations use a combination 
of methods:
1. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW: This involves 
forecasting the future cash profits a 
business will generate, and discounting 
these back to the present day at the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital. The 
cash flows are discounted to reflect the 
time value of money, where $1 today is 
worth more than $1 tomorrow due to the 
returns that could be made by investing 
the $1.
2. PRICE TO BOOK VALUE: This involves 
valuing the business using a multiple on 
the book value of the company (assets less 
liabilities). This multiple will depend on the 
returns a business generates as well as the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital.
3. PRICE TO EARNINGS: This involves valuing 
the business using a multiple on the profits 
of the company. This multiple is typically 
drawn from past experiences of similar 
sales, including from overseas.
Initially, the NSW Treasury estimated the 49% 
stake at $13B, based on a price to earnings 
multiple drawn from past experiences at 
home and abroad. Based on UBS’ valuation, 
this is unlikely to reflect the value the NSW 
Government will receive from the sale.
This report finds the $20B in proceeds claimed by 
the NSW Government for the privatisation of T&D 
assets to be a significant over estimation.
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The latest valuation figure from investment bank 
UBS puts the sale price closer to $11B, substantially 
below Treasury’s estimate of $13B (See Box 6 
above). Moreover, the interest element of the $20B is 
based on a theoretically tenuous estimate of the time 
value of money – holding the proceeds of the sale 
over the lifetime of the asset is more likely to destroy 
value for the government than to create it, given that 
the dividends the government is earning on these 
assets certainly exceed the yield it would earn on 
investments of a similar risk level. After including the 
$2 billion asset recycling subsidy from the Australian 
Government – which cannot be guaranteed – this 
report expects the true value of the proceeds to be 
approximately $13B. 
Currently, the NSW Government’s debt 
management agency, T-Corp, is issuing debt 
at a coupon rate of between 2.5% and 3.75%, 
depending on the maturity bonds.61 Based on a 
realistic assumption that the NSW Government 
would pay a coupon rate of around 3% for debt 
issued to pay for its major infrastructure projects 
planned, this suggests that, by selling the assets 
to pay for the infrastructure investments, the NSW 
Government could save around $390M a year in 
interest payments. Even in the unlikely event that 
the sale delivered $15B to the NSW Government 
and all of the proceeds were used to lower 
government debt, the interest saving would be just 
$450M per annum. 
When compared to the $1.7B in annual cash 
injections from the network businesses – of which 
approximately $1.3B would be lost under the 
proposed privatisation62 – it becomes apparent that 
the privatisation of NSW assets would be highly 
detrimental to the budgetary position of the NSW 
Government. The potential interest savings from 
reduced NSW Government debt are dwarfed by 
the loss of income that would arise were the state’s 
T&D assets privatised.
As was outlined above, any potential upside for 
credit ratings associated with a reduction in debt 
is likely to be minimal. In contrast, the reduced 
income associated with privatisation will make 
it more difficult to keep expense growth below 
revenue growth – a far more important factor for 
ratings agencies when determining the state’s 
credit rating.* 
In the medium- to long-term, the lost revenue is 
a significant concern for the budgetary position. 
There are several factors that challenge the 
medium- to long-term outlook of the state budget, 
including the risk of a slowdown or correction in the 
housing market and increased pressures arising 
from the ageing of the population. 
The RBA along with many private sector 
economists have recently indicated the view that 
the housing market in Sydney is overvalued, and 
that there may be a correction in prices, or at least 
a moderation in price increases and lower activity 
(turnover) as a result.63 
Deloitte Access Economics has calculated that 
Sydney house prices are currently overvalued 
by about 10%, suggesting a correction of this 
magnitude in the future is possible.64 Increases 
in stamp duty from property – which is directly 
correlated to house prices and turnover in the 
market – have strongly underpinned the budget 
position in recent years, and are built into the NSW 
Government’s revenue forecasts going forward. 
Given this, a scenario in which state revenue comes 
under renewed pressure due to falling property 
prices is plausible. 
The potential interest savings from reduced 
NSW Government debt are dwarfed by the 
loss of income that would arise were the 
state’s T&D assets privatised.
* This report notes that the AER’s recently-released draft determination for the network businesses will likely reduce these dividends 
in the future. Nevertheless, this report strongly emphasises that the value the NSW Government will receive from the sale will also, by 
definition, decrease in the same portions as the returns that these businesses generate. Initial analysis by the authors suggests that 
the proposed changes may decrease the return on equity for NSW T&D assets by approximately 23% (10.5% sought to 8.1% offered). 
Such a deterioration would substantially reduce the potential sale value of these assets. Because the determination is still in draft stage 
– with feedback and submissions still being sought – further consideration of these impacts was unable to be included in this report.
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At the same time, Australian Government cuts 
to health and education will inevitably result in 
state governments needing to increase their own 
expenditure in these areas so as to avoid the 
substantial reductions in service access and quality 
that would otherwise occur without such an increase. 
Finally, the ageing of our population will result in a 
substantial restructuring of the Australian workforce 
with significant implications for government revenue 
and expenditure. While in 1970 there were 7.5 
people of working age for every person over the 
age of 65, by 2010 this ratio had fallen to 5 to 1. 
By 2050, this ratio will fall further to just 2.4 to 1, 
leaving the government with substantially fewer 
taxpayers to support a growing contingent of 
retirees with expensive requirements in both the 
health care and aged care sectors.65
Similar problems exist at the state government 
level. As the scales tilt from a worker dominated 
community to a retiree abundant community, 
revenue from payroll tax will be increasingly 
stretched to accommodate the advanced 
healthcare needs of an older population.66 
Payroll tax is NSW’s largest tax and last year 
accounted for 30% of state government revenue.
Over the forward estimates, the NSW Government 
is expecting to collect $34.3 billion in payroll tax. 
Were the ratio of workers to non-workers the same 
today as is forecast to be the case for 2050, all 
other things being equal or held constant, payroll 
tax receipts would be almost $18 billion lower.
While the interaction between an ageing population 
and state payroll tax receipts is somewhat more 
complicated than the above calculation would 
suggest, the broad conclusion is correct. An 
ageing population will leave state budgets with less 
revenue at precisely the same time that they will 
need to spend more on the advanced health needs 
of our senior Australians.
From 2009–10 to 2049–50, real health spending on 
those aged over 65 years is expected to increase 
around seven-fold. Over the same period, real 
health spending on those over 85 years is expected 
to increase around twelve-fold. The number of 
people with Alzheimer’s alone will grow to 900,000. 
In addition to these demographic pressures, 
demand for higher standards of health care will 
also place added pressure on the government 
to increase health expenditure, as will the costs 
associated with rapid technological innovation.
PwC has estimated that between now and 2050, 
the combined deficits of federal and state/territory 
governments will exceed 5.5% of GDP during this 
period, with total public net debt increasing to 
approximately 80% of GDP. 
Were this forecast to eventuate, the interest 
costs associated with government debt would 
grow to approximately 34% of GDP, representing 
an annual interest burden of close to $550 billion 
in today’s dollars.
FIGURE 21: TOTAL PUBLIC NET DEBT: COMMONWEALTH AND STATE/TERRITORY GOVERNMENTS, 
WITH PUBLIC DEBT INTEREST CAPITALIZED FROM 2016-17, % OF GDP 67
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As state and federal budgets are increasingly 
stretched by the combination of rising costs and 
shrinking revenue, credit ratings are going to come 
under increasing pressure. Maintaining revenue 
growth will be just as important as maintaining 
spending restraint. These demographic pressures 
will continue to build over time, meaning that in the 
long-run, the dividend stream associated with state 
T&D assets is likely to become more valuable as 
economic conditions deteriorate. 
Faced with these medium- to long-term challenges, 
the NSW Government is proposing to strip out 
an important element of its recurrent revenue by 
forgoing dividend payments in order to pay down 
debt and fund major infrastructure projects. Given 
that financial management (keeping revenue growth 
above expense growth) is weighted twice as heavily 
as overall debt levels when determining the state’s 
credit rating, this report concludes that the sale 
of T&D assets – which permanently foregoes the 
revenue generated by them – is not a prudent 
budgetary measure in the medium- to long-term. 
Privatisation is more likely to have a negative impact 
on credit ratings than a positive one.
This report argues that it would be more prudent 
to manage NSW Government debt levels through 
other structural reforms rather than selling the T&D 
assets in order to minimise debt requirements for 
infrastructure projects. 
This report calls on the NSW Government to 
consider alternative sources for revenue, whilst 
also maintaining prudent spending levels. Most 
importantly, this report recommends keeping 
the revenue generated by the T&D network on 
the NSW Government’s books in order to help it 
navigate a challenging medium- to long-term fiscal 
outlook. 
Whilst this report agrees that infrastructure 
investment is critical to driving economic growth 
and productivity, this report does not believe the 
NSW Government has found the right solution to 
funding such infrastructure investment. This report 
notes that, to date, the NSW Government appears 
to have given minimal consideration to alternative 
methods for the funding and financing of planned 
infrastructure. In our view, the partial sale of the 
Transmission & Distribution network is not the 
right approach to the funding of new transport 
infrastructure. 
There are other mechanisms that could assist 
in minimising any increase in government debt, 
though a full discussion of these is beyond the 
scope of this report. User-Pays systems, Tax 
Increment Financing, Joint Property Development, 
and other value capture mechanisms have enjoyed 
many success stories around the world. This report 
suggests that the NSW Government ensure it has 
examined the full range of options for funding its 
planned infrastructure.
Getting us there: Funding the Infrastructure 
of Tomorrow was also released by the 
McKell Institute in November 2014. This report 
recommends reviewing that report for further 
discussion on alternative methods for funding the 
state’s infrastructure plans.
Australian Government cuts to health and 
education will inevitably result in state 
governments needing to increase their own 
expenditure in these areas so as to avoid 
the substantial reductions in service access 
and quality that would otherwise occur 
without such an increase.
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This report finds no compelling evidence that 
network businesses would operate more efficiently 
under private ownership than public ownership. 
The physical span of different T&D networks 
is the single largest factor behind variations in 
both operational and capital expenditure. Private 
networks also have higher overheads and the 
growth rates associated with those entities are 
higher in privately operated networks. 
S&P also places a significantly higher weighting 
on the ability of the NSW Government to keep 
expenses growth below revenue growth than it 
does on overall debt. This means that the loss 
of recurrent revenue is likely to have a negative 
impact on credit ratings over the medium- to long-
term, particularly given the NSW Government’s 
stated intention of recycling the capital back 
into new transport projects. Given the potential 
financial challenges facing the NSW Government’s 
budget position in the medium- to long-term, the 
government avoid selling off its recurrent revenue 
streams in order to fund transport and other 
infrastructure projects. 
This report recommends that a thorough review 
be undertaken to assess performance of NSW 
T&D businesses with the aim of realising potential 
efficiency gains while maintaining public ownership. 
Any review should consider industry structure, 
operational matters, and social outcomes, with all 
efficiency gains to be reinvested in government 
services or passed to consumers by way of price 
reductions.
Conclusion
This report strongly recommends that the NSW Government leave electricity 
Transmission and Distribution assets in public ownership. 
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1. The AER’s draft determination does attempt 
to take account of physical span but the 
authors of this report are of the view that the 
AER does not choose the best form of the 
relationship. The AER has chosen to consider 
the relationship between opex and customer 
density. In contrast, this report has run a 
regression of upkeep costs on physical span. 
It is the view of the authors that it is physical 
span that drives higher per customer costs due 
to, for instance, the need for a larger labour 
force, more vegetation management, and so 
on. The data bears this out, with a much higher 
correlation between upkeep costs per customer 
and physical span than between opex costs per 
customer and customer density.
2. The AER looks at asset cost (i.e. depreciation 
plus the WACC multiplied by the RAB) instead 
of capex as their response to some of the 
issues discussed within the report around 
capex being inconsistent across time. The 
authors chose not to examine the relationship 
this way. An asset that has not been replaced 
for a long time (e.g. older assets in the Victorian 
networks) will have a lot more accumulated 
depreciation and hence a lower asset cost 
because the value of their RAB is lower, 
whereas a brand new asset (e.g. the 33Kv 
assets recently purchased by Ausgrid during its 
substantial asset replacement program) would 
not have had much cumulative depreciation 
and will therefore have a higher asset cost. The 
authors of this report strongly feel that the most 
appropriate approach to measuring efficiency 
is to compare capex and not asset costs, and 
instead to take measures to understand the 
drivers of volatility (including asset replacement 
and investment cycles).
3. The AER has argued that Victorian networks 
are more efficient in their opex at least partly 
because of the use of contractors. The 
evidence examined within this report found no 
evidence to suggest that the use of contractors 
had delivered greater efficiencies in other states. 
4. The AER will be cutting the rate of return on all 
networks, not just the NSW ones. This should 
theoretically have the exact same impact on 
the dividends the government earns from 
the businesses as it would on the sale value 
secured through privatisation.
5. The AER has strongly focused on the results 
of its Multilateral Total Factor Productivity 
model that concludes that NSW networks 
are more efficient. However, the AER does 
note that there are lots of different potential 
model specifications that could have been 
selected. Questions remain whether the AER 
has got these relationships right, though a 
detailed examination is beyond the scope of 
this report. Further scrutiny of these factors will 
likely be presented in submissions to the draft 
determination, with changes possible in the final 
determination released by the AER.  
Appendix:Comments on 
the AER Draft Determination
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